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abstract: LCG is a logic of change proposed in 2007 by Świętorzecka . Its initial 
goal was to analyze in a logical framework the aristotelian theory of substantial 
change – a kind of change that is more fundamental than others . Motivated by 
aristotle’s account, Świętorzecka proposes to enrich the language of classical logic 
by two operators of change, reflecting the aristotelian dichotomy of generation and 
corruption . However, along with the aristotelian interpretation, as an independent 
formal system, LCG offers a plethora of possible interpretations and insights . In 
the present article I briefly summarize the existing work in LCG and reflect on its 
further development .
key words: aristotelian theory of substantial change, classical conceptions of change-
ability, epistemic changes, growing language, logic of change LCG, modality, tem-
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1. Introduction
The logic LCG, a variant of a logic of change, was proposed in (2007) by 
K . Świętorzecka . Its initial goal was to analyze in a logical framework the 
aristotelian theory of substantial change . aristotle proposed this kind of 
change to solve the old problem of the possibility of change itself . one of 
the persisting older views was that of Parmenides, who famously claimed 
that there was no change whatsoever . This counterintuitive view was the 
result of the infamous dilemma ascribed to Parmenides and described by 
aristotle in (Phys 191a30-31) . There are only two ways in which something 
can come-to-be . Either from what already is, or from what is not . This is the 
dilemma . What makes it infamous is that neither option is possible . There-
fore, nothing can come-to-be . aristotle tackles this problem by proposing a 
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new kind of change, substantial change, thus dissolving the dilemma . It is 
beyond the scope of this article to give a full characterization of aristotle’s 
theory of change . aristotle’s philosophy plays only an inspirational role in 
the formalism of LCG, given most elaborately in (Świętorzecka 2008b) . The 
logic of change LCG does not purport to fully represent all of aristotle’s 
views on change . of course, there are some facets of LCG directly inspired 
by aristotle’s insights . Nevertheless, LCG, considered as an independent for-
mal system, offers a plethora of possible interpretations and applications to 
philosophical problems .
The subjects of change in the aristotelian framework are individual 
substances . These substances undergo various kinds of change, most notably 
substantial change . We speak about substantial change when one substance 
becomes another . The components of substantial change are disappearing 
(destruction) and coming-into-being (generation) (Świętorzecka 2008b) . “[I]n 
substances, the coming-to-be of one thing is always a passing-away of an-
other, and the passing-away of one thing is always another’s coming-to-be” 
(cf . GC 319a20-22; Met 994b5-6; Phys 208a9-10; cited in Świętorzecka 
2008b: 15) . Looking to analyze this account in the logical setting, a couple of 
philosophical and logical remarks are in order . They are given most notably 
in (Świętorzecka 2008b) which further develops the account proposed in 
(Świętorzecka 2008a) .
Firstly, one has to consider the very subjects of change . aristotle speaks 
about individual substances undergoing change . The language of LCG is a 
propositional language enriched by one primitive operator of change . So, in 
LCG the subjects of change are situations . aristotle talks about things coming 
to be or disappearing, while we talk about situations in which things come to 
be or disappear . These situations are expressed by formulas or sentences of logic 
LCG . Some further justifications of this approach are given in (Świętorzecka 
2008b) .
Secondly, there is the issue of the very ability of the system to simulate 
situations appearing and disappearing . The usual propositional languages are 
not designed to express such a dynamicity . In classical logic, the true proposi-
tions are usually just given and nothing changes . In standard temporal ap-
proaches there is change, but it is not substantial in a sense that sentences 
may change only their truth values . Still, the set of atomic sentences remains 
constant . In LCG we have a constantly growing set of atomic sentences . More 
on that in the second chapter .
There are also some more typically philosophical remarks which this 
logic of change wants to consider . (Świętorzecka 2008b) gives special atten-
tion to the notions of time and continuity vis-à-vis change . Following aris-
totle, changeability-in-general is assumed to be ontologically independent of 
153I . RESToVIć: The First Decade of the Logic of Change LCG
time . Generation and destruction “[…] are not even measurable in time since 
it is precisely the existence of time that is dependent on the existence of sub-
stance […]” (Świętorzecka 2008b: 13) . This will be reflected in the formalism, 
where the operator of change C is chosen as primitive . as we will see later, this 
becomes important when comparing LCG to other formal systems .
Regarding the continuity of change, substantial changes are said to be 
dichotomous. This is reflected in the language of LCG . We are able to dis-
tinguish between different substances coming to be and disappearing at dif-
ferent stages of a growing universe1 . all the changes occurring in LCG are 
discrete . Correspondingly, if we decide to adopt a temporal interpretation of 
change in LCG, we get a discrete branching temporal structure with the first 
element . Further remarks on this interpretation are given in (Czermak and 
Świętorzecka 2011) . With the above philosophical considerations and com-
mitments, we can turn to the formal description of LCG .
2. LCG Calculus
The following characterization is taken mostly form (Świętorzecka and Czer-
mak 2012), where LCG is considered separately from aristotelian philosophy . 
To get LCG we add to the language of propositional logic the primitive opera-
tor C, which reads “it changes that…” . LCG has another important non-
standard component, the notion of a level of a formula . atomic propositions 
in LCG are indexed and form a set {α1, α2, α3, …, αn} . From a philosophical 
standpoint, we can call the elements elementary situations (Świętorzecka 
2008b), keeping in mind the considerations about the subjects undergoing 
change given in the Introduction . Let us consider an example . The formula 
α3 → (α1 ⋁ α7) is said to be of the minimal level of 7 . This number is the great-
est index of an atomic subformula in the given formula . The level is minimal 
because the above formula can first appear only at the stage 7 of a develop-
ment of a universe . Before that stage, it lacks truth value . But after that, it is 
always either true or false . Therefore, α3 → (α1 ⋁ α7) is of the minimal level 7, 
but also of the levels 8, 10, and so on .
To get the full axiomatic system of LCG, we take as axioms all classical 
propositional tautologies along with the four representative axiom schemata . 
Concerning the rules of inference, we have the usual modus ponens, the 
¬C-rule and the replacement rule . The ¬C-rule simply states that theorems 
of the system do not change, formally: A  ¬CA, where A is a theorem . The 
replacement rule says that if we have a formula A with a subformula B (nota-
1 We can also consider an epistemic interpretation . More information on interpretations 
of LCG, as well as on the notion of a universe, is provided in chapters 4 and 3, respectively .
154 Prolegomena 16 (2) 2017
tion: A[B]) and it follows that B is equivalent to B' (formally: B ↔ B'), then 
we can replace the subformula B in A with B' (we can infer A[B']) . axiomati-
cally, LCG is characterized by four axiom schemata:
ax1) CA → C ¬A
ax2) C(A ⋀ B) → CA ⋁ CB
ax3) (¬A ⋀ B ⋀ CA ⋀ ¬CB) → C(A ⋀ B)
ax4) (¬A ⋀ ¬B ⋀ CA ⋀ CB) → C(A ⋀ B) .
Let us briefly consider the intuitive interpretation of the above schemata . For 
the present purpose, assume only that changes expressed by C are changes 
to the truth value . So, ax1 says that if a formula changes its truth value, so 
will its negation . This, in my opinion, perfectly reflects our “naïve” under-
standing of change . The second axiom schema is also quite uncontroversial, 
describing the way in which we can distribute the operator of change . Finally, 
ax3 and ax4 may at first sight appear to lack the intuitive clarity of ax1 and 
ax2 . Let us look at them together . They share the same consequent, namely 
C(A ⋀ B) . This means that they both give us conditions for changing the truth 
value of A ⋀ B. Now, both in the ax3 and in ax4 the conjunction A ⋀ B is 
not true in the antecedent . We could say that ax3 and ax4 provide us with 
the conditions for a change of a conjunction, given that the conjunction does 
not hold . Take ax4 . It says that if we do not have nor A nor B, to change their 
conjunction we have to change both elements .
I have previously said that the above four axiom schemata are charac-
teristic of LCG . But C is not the only operator characteristic of LCG . While 
C lets us speak about changes to the truth value, the operator G allows us 
to speak about changes in complexity in a sense of increasing the level of a 
formula . With the help of the latter operator, we can acquire a growing lan-
guage . as a matter of fact, G is a shorthand for two operators, G+and G–, 
which are introduced definitionally on the object-language level to reflect 
the phenomenon of a growing language . Let formula A be of minimal level 
n – 1, then:
Def . G+) G+ A ↔ (A ⋀ αn)
Def . G–) G– A ↔ (A ⋀ ¬αn) .
Let ±αn denote either αn or ¬αn . Now we can understand G-changes as growth 
(which – incidentally – starts with a “g”) in complexity or level of a formula . 
To say that a proposition underwent a G-change is to say that it was suple-
mented by a new proposition ±αn . The proposition ±αn introduces either a 
positive or a negative “atomic situation” . Remarks on the expanding language 
are given in (Świętorzecka 2012) .
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3. The semantics of LCG
The semantics of LCG has an important non-standard component, linked 
to the notion of a level of a formula . Let Bn denote the set of all possible co-
njunctions ±α1 ⋀…⋀ ± αn . We understand Bn as the universe of the level n . The 
elements of a given Bn are understood as possible worlds (Świętorzecka 2008b) . 
From all the possible conjunctions in a given universe, only one can be true . In 
other words, only one of the possible worlds in a given universe is actual . The 
notion of truth is defined with the help of the function φ, called a history of the 
development of a universe . When speaking about φ, we interpret the number n 
as the stage of a universe . For each stage n, φ(n) chooses exactly one conjunction 
of the minimal level n . That conjunction is considered to be a fact in Bn, as op-
posed to other conjunctions, which are merely fictions (Świętorzecka 2008b) . 
Moreover, as n rises, so does the number of possible worlds in a given universe . 
We start with B1, where there are only two possible worlds: α1 and ¬α1 . at each 
new stage, the number of possible worlds is doubled . For every n there are 2n 
conjunctions or possible worlds . This signifies a considerable dynamicity .
Consider therefore again the formula α3 → (α1 ⋁ α7). Having α7 as a sub-
formula, it can first appear at the seventh stage of the development of the universe . 
We know that the universe at stage 7 (or B7) is a set of all possible conjunctions 
from ±α1 to ±α7 . How many conjunctions are there in B7? as it turns out: 27 = 
128 . at its seventh stage, the universe has 128 possible worlds, all of them of 
the length (or complexity) of 7 . and in B7 there is exactly one actual world φ(7) 
and 127 fictitious worlds . Let us assume that α3 → (α1 ⋁ α7) is true in the actual 
world . This means that it follows from a seven-membered conjunction that “ac-
tually” holds (recall that this conjunction consists of atomic formulas and their 
negations) . Fair enough, but it seems that α3 → (α1 ⋁ α7) can also follow from 
one of the 127 fictitious conjunctions . Surely there is some alternative history ψ in 
which α3 → (α1 ⋁ α7) follows from the axioms of LCG and a given conjunction 
of seven elementary formulas or negations thereof . out of 127 worlds in B7 
which are not actual, how many of them make true the formula α3 → (α1 ⋁ α7)? 
I will leave it to the reader to ponder about the answer – the point of this exam-
ple is that the dynamic language of LCG opens new perspectives and questions 
which cannot be proposed in the setting of classical propositional logic .
Now we have the formal prerequisites to formally define the concepts of 
truth and validity in LCG . Regarding the truth conditions, for any atomic 
formula αk (1 ≤ k ≤ n) and complex formula A of level n:
i)  φ n αk iff αk occurs in φ(n) without the sign of negation
ii)   φ n CA iff (φ n A and φ n+1 A) or (φ n A and φ n+1 A) .
If A is of the minimal level n – 1:
iii) φ n G+A iff φ n A and φ n αn
iv)  φ n G–A iff φ n A and φ n αn .
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Truth conditions for the usual logical connectives are the same as in classical 
propositional logic, mutatis mutandis . Moreover and importantly:
*) If n < lv(A) then φ n A is not defined, i .e . A lacks truth value at n 
(where lv(A) signifies the minimal level of the formula A) .
φ n A stands for “A is true at stage n of some universe” . Previously, we 
adopted an intuitive interpretation of C-changes as changes to the truth 
value . Now we can see that we were initially correct . Truth conditions for 
G-changes are semantical counterparts of their definitions given in the previ-
ous chapter .
In the above conditions we see two deviations from the semantics of clas-
sical propositional logic . First is the case of atomic propositions . The second 
case applies to (nearly) all other propositions . The first case is the underlying 
structure of LCG, differing from the classical picture . It is composed out of 
conjunctions of atomic formulas and negations thereof . To say that αk is true 
is to say that is located at the k-th place of the conjunction (which is φ(n)) . 
We can picture atomic formulas forming “chains” of complex situations . The 
second deviation appears to be of both logical and philosophical importance . 
From the logical point of view, there can be cases when a proposition does 
not have a truth value . Recall the formula α3 → (α1 ⋁ α7) . one cannot decide 
on its truth value before level 7 . Can this be considered a deviation from the 
famous principle of excluded middle? This proviso can also be of philosophi-
cal importance . When asserting α3 → (α1 ⋁ α7) in B3, are we just talking gib-
berish, or expressing a hitherto undecidable proposition?
The last non-classical feature of LCG is the notion of φ-validity . It is a 
weaker version of validity proper, which is in turn defined by the weaker no-
tion . For any formula A:
Def . φ-val .) A is φ-valid iff φ k A for all k: n ≤ k, where A is of the mini-
mal level n
Def . val .) A is valid iff A is φ-valid for all functions φ .
Every φ is a choice function . For every consecutive n, it chooses one φ(n) . Now, 
the value of φ can be considered “random” . at each stage of the universe, 
the choice function φ chooses one possible word . and if it happens for a 
formula to be as lucky as to be true in every consecutive possible world, it 
is called φ-valid . This is a weaker notion of validity, reserved not only for 
logical truths . The definition of validity proper mentions “all functions φ ” . 
In (Świętorzecka 2008b) remarks are given on different kinds of histories . 
additionally, we can characterize the “rhythms” of changing truth values by 
introducing certain formulas as axiom schemata .
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The calculus LCG is sound and complete with respect to the here 
presented semantics . The full proofs are given in (Świętorzecka 2008b) . 
Completeness is proved using two different techniques – namely – using 
conjunctive normal forms and Henkin-style proof .
4. Applications and interpretations of LCG
Having a sound and complete formal system, its history ceases to matter . as 
a mathematical intuitionist would say – once constructed, a mathematical 
entity develops a life of its own, undergoing constant transformation . The 
hallmark operators of LCG offer a wide range of possible interpretations . 
In the last chapter we spoke about a growing universe . The successive values 
of φ(n) can therefore have an ontological interpretation, inherited from the 
aristotelian motivation . alternatively, we can model growing sets of beliefs 
of some agent, or the stages of a development of a proof or argumentation 
(Świętorzecka and Czermak 2012) . (Świętorzecka and Czermak 2015) gives 
a Leibnizian interpretation: the notion of monads and the relation of compos-
sibility are expressed in the language of LCG . In (Restović 2017) LCG is used 
to formally analyze the philosophy of L . E . J . Brouwer .
Leaving Leibniz and Brouwer aside for another occasion, let us consider 
Parmenides and Heraclitus, as was done in (Świętorzecka 2009) . as we have 
seen in the Introduction, aristotle formulated his account as a response to his 
predecessors . So, it is only natural to explore what LCG as a modern tool can 
contribute to the discussion . In the setting of LCG, Parmenides’ view can be 
expressed by the formula ¬CA . We can add this to LCG as an axiom schema 
to get a logic of Parmenides . In the case of Heraclitus, for whom change is 
all there is, we run into a problem . It turns out that there can be no “logic of 
Heraclitus“, which would be intuitively characterized by the axiom schema 
CA . The more obvious reason for this is the ¬C-rule of LCG, which makes 
sure theorems do not change . If everything were to change, so would the 
theorems, but they cannot, since they are theorems . We have an immediate 
contradiction . So, change is not all there is, but could contingencies (con-
stantly) change? If we add CA as an axiom schema, and reserve A only for 
contingent formulas2, we still get a contradiction . a simple proof is given in 
(Świętorzecka 2009) .
Speaking of contradictions, LCG is also applied to the two famous an-
cient paradoxes . In (Świętorzecka 2009) LCG is used and slightly semanti-
cally modified in order to express the liar’s paradox . It is shown that in LCG 
the characteristic self-referential sentences of a liar are not strictly paradoxi-
2 Contingent formulas are such formulas that are not theorems of the system, but neither 
are their negations theorems .
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cal . They merely have oscillating truth values . In (Czermak and Świętorzecka 
2011) the language of LCG is used to give a new perspective on the nature 
of time in the setting of Zeno’s paradoxes . as noted above, if we decide to 
give LCG a temporal interpretation, we get discrete time . Świętorzecka and 
Czermak note that this is in opposition to the view which Zeno is committed 
to . and speaking of oppositions, LCG can also contribute to the long-lasting 
discussion about the square of oppositions . In (Świętorzecka and Czermak 
2010) the changing truth values expressible in LCG are associated with geo-
metrical objects like squares and cubes .
Having reflected on the tradition, it is only when considering LCG as an 
independent formal system that we start uncovering its full potential . (God-
lewski, Świętorzecka and Mulawka 2014) joins the efforts of artificial intel-
ligence in implementing more complex logical systems in a machine . There 
is given a computer method of finding valuations forcing validity of LCG 
formulas . already in (Świętorzecka 2009) LCG is compared to a logic of a . 
Prior (1957) . He developed a logic with a temporal operator, to be able to 
speak about the future . Some parallels can be drawn between LCG and Pri-
or’s system . In a way, LCG also speaks about the future, but only indirectly . 
asserting CA is asserting that A will change in the future, but “the future” is 
not a primitive concept . In (Świętorzecka 2008b) an alternative calculus is 
proposed, replacing the operator C with the operator N, which reads: “the 
next is that …” . all sentences with C’s can be translated into sentences only 
with N’s .3 Naturally, different axioms are needed . But all in all, it follows 
that LCG with the operator N is equivalent to Prior’s calculus, which is again 
equivalent to that of von Wright (1965), as shown by Clifford (1966) .
The inter-definability of time and change in a formalism is an interest-
ing topic in-and-of itself . For instance, in a frame of formal ontology, the 
decision about the priority or posteriority of time vis-à-vis change can be the 
very starting point . There is even a middle ground . We can take both C and 
N to be primitive in our system, thus extending the vocabulary of the logic 
of change .
5. Extensions and ongoing research
a modal extension of LCG is given in (Świętorzecka and Czermak 2015) . 
The language of LCG is enriched by the two characteristic modal operators 
 and  to obtain the system LCS4 . The notion of necessity is introduced, 
allowing us to speak about a formula being true in all the next stages . We had 
something similar before, but in the meta-theory . LCS4 introduces a coun-
3 CA ↔ (A ↔ ¬NA); φ n NA iff φ n+1 A .
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terpart of φ-validity on the object-language level, endowing  with the truth 
condition that, if lv(A) ≤ n, then
v) φ n A iff ∀k≥nφ k A .
Given the axiomatic characterization of LCS4, in it we can derive the characte-
ristic axiom of S4 .3: (A → B) ⋁ (B → A) . The system LCS4 is also 
sound and complete .
an alternative extension of LCG was proposed by M . Łyczak in (2017) . 
He introduces the operator B, to account for the phenomenon of changing 
beliefs . With C and G in stock, he proposes a logic that will capture in a 
unique way the dynamics of changing beliefs, thereby giving a new perspec-
tive distinct from the traditional approach of (alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and 
Makinson 1985) or (Segerberg 1999) . at the time of writing this article, 
“the logic of changing beliefs” is still under development, and so is LCG 
– being the formal basis . To sum up – in its first decade LCG has proven 
to be a fruitful starting point for developing new logical systems, as well 
as a powerful tool for logical analysis of both philosophical and logical 
problems .4
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